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 1  See generally,  A Anghie  Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP Cam-
bridge 2004) ;  C Mieville  Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Brill Leiden 2005) ; 
 J Fisch  Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht (Steiner Stuttgart 1984) ;  WG Grewe  The Epochs of 
International Law (M Byers trans) (De Gruyter Berlin 2000) ;  M Koskenniemi  The Gentle Civiliser of 
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (CUP Cambridge 2002) . 
 2   R Tuck  The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to 
Kant (OUP Oxford 1999) at 79 . 
 1. Introduction 
 To speak today of the ‘colonial origins of international law’ is arguably no longer a 
standpoint of dissent, or of a radical revisionism, but one which is situated in the 
centre-ground of accounts of international legal history. 1 What is made of that obser-
vation is a matter upon which there remains a not insignifi cant divergence of opin-
ion, but a consciousness that the emergence of the European states-system in the 
post-Westphalian era was not merely incidentally related to the expansion of mer-
cantile empires and the taking of colonial possessions, but was rather intimately con-
nected with it, is one that is widely shared. It is no longer possible to read Grotius 
without attending to the fact that much of his work seemed to be written as an ‘apol-
ogy for the whole Dutch commercial expansion into the Indies’, 2 or engage with the 
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historic formation of notions of war, sovereignty and territory and not notice the role 
they assumed in the violent expansion of European empires. 
 At certain points of time, of course, the relationship between the development of 
nascent legal doctrine and the practice of colonial rule has been entirely transparent. Just 
as Vitoria’s famous lectures from 1532— De Indis Noviter Inventis and  De Jure Bellis His-
panorum in Barbaros 3 —addressed themselves to the titles the Spanish put forward in 
order to justify their domination in the New World, so also, some 360 years later, West-
lake, Martitz, Hornung, and other members of the newly-formed Institut de Droit Inter-
national were to debate the terms under which territory in Africa might be brought 
under colonial rule. 4 On other occasions, and far more frequently, colonialism has 
remained a signifi cant background theme, providing the setting for doctrinal debates 
over freedom of the high seas, the use of force, title to territory, recognition, and state-
hood. Dealing with its legacy, of course, was also a central preoccupation in the 20th 
century both informing institutional initiatives (mandates and trusteeships) and emer-
gent doctrine such as that relating to self-determination, sovereignty over natural 
resources, human rights, the law of armed confl ict, state succession, and the boundary 
delimitation ( uti possidetis iuris ). There is, it might be suggested, scarcely a single area of 
international law that has not, in some manner or other, been informed by this history. 
 Yet even if there is broad concurrence in the view that the history of international 
law is intimately related to the history of colonial rule, there is, as I have already sug-
gested, considerably less agreement over ‘how’ one may plausibly articulate, or 
account for, that relationship. For some, the relationship is almost an incidental 
one—the expansion of European empires and the development of international law 
being the product of an intra-European rivalry whose centre of gravity remained 
fi rmly European. 5 For others, the relationship is taken to be far more central, but here 
again the contrasts are marked. For Tony Anghie, for example, European interna-
tional law not only provided a means of legitimizing imperialism, but was also 
profoundly shaped by that encounter, encoding within its disciplinary structures 
(especially sovereignty) the discriminatory features of cultural difference. 6 For China 
Mieville, by contrast, colonization was to be understood not so much in terms of its 
content, but in terms of the imperialism of its form:
 Colonialism is in the very form, the structure of international law itself, predicated on global 
trade between inherently unequal polities, with unequal coercive violence implied in the 
very commodity form. This unequal coercion is what forces particular content into the legal 
form. 7 
 3   F De Victoria  De Indis et De Iure Belli relectiones (E Nys ed) (Carnegie Institution Washington 1917) . 
 4  See The Gentle Civiliser of Nations (n 1) 149–52. 
 5  Eg The Epochs of International Law (n 1);  C Schmitt  The Nomos of the Earth (Telos Press Publishing 
New York 2006) . 
 6  Imperialism (n 1) 6–7. 
 7  Between Equal Rights (n 1) 178. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 08/03/2012, SPi
0001634692.INDD   863 8/3/2012   12:47:36 PM
   interaction or imposition
 The instantiation of an international legal order governed by principles of sovereign 
equality and reciprocity thus formed a central facet of the emergent mercantilist, 
then capitalist/imperial, system in which the colony represented merely the most vis-
ible form of the accumulatory impulse that lay at its heart. 
 For all their differences, two particular assumptions have remained common in 
such accounts: one of which is reliance upon a conceptual separation between the 
material and ideological facets of international relations—between state practice 
and the (potentially oppositional) discourse of international law. 8 The other being a 
tendency to reify notions of State and sovereignty as the key architectural features of 
international relations, whose existence from the Peace of Westphalia onwards is 
taken to be both ‘given’ and historically ‘constant’. 9 These are obviously related—the 
distinction between the ideological superstructure of international legal thought and 
the material impulses upon which it worked fi nding its rationality in the pre-
existence of a particular structure of power in the form of the nation-state. The dif-
fi culty, of course, is that such an account not only leaves entirely beyond the reach of 
theory the forms of knowledge and technologies of rule that underpinned the emer-
gence of the process by which the idea of the state has come to be reifi ed (at some 
point in time), but is also curiously incapable of explaining itself: how was it that 
international law came to be regarded as the servile adjunct to imperial rule? Was this 
not, historically, something which was generated in the same story? 
 The concern of this chapter thus would be to provide an outline sketch of this 
putative ‘relationship’ between international law and colonial practice across the 
16th–19th centuries in a way that both avoids the indulgence of believing that the law 
of nations was somehow abstracted from the material processes of colonial rule 
(that it was, in that sense, purely ideological), and treats with scepticism the claim 
that the institutions of ‘State’ or ‘sovereignty’ can be taken as historically continuous 
phenomena. 10 This means, on one side, attempting to situate the discourses on the 
law of nations ‘inside’ an account of the evolving technology of government and rule 
rather than seeing them as a form of external critique or mode of validation. On the 
other hand, it also means trying to conceptualize the process of colonization not 
simply in terms of a straightforward ‘extension’ of a pre-formed European sover-
eignty to the non-European world, but one whose dynamics were shaped by, and 
shaped in turn, changing conceptions as to the nature and character of governmen-
tal authority. 
 8  Eg  J Fisch ‘The Role of International Law in the Territorial Expansion of Europe 16th–20th Centu-
ries’ (2000) 3 International Center for Comparative Law and Politics Review 4–13 ;  D Armitage  The Ideo-
logical Origins of the British Empire (CUP Cambridge 2000) ;  A Pagden  Lords of all the World: Ideologies of 
Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–c. 1800 (Yale University Press New Haven 1995) . 
 9  Eg  H Wheaton  History of International Law in Europe and America (Gould New York 1842); Between 
Equal Rights (n 1) 169. 
 10   Cf M Foucault  Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78 (M Senellart 
ed, G Burchell trans) (Picador New York 2007) at 277 . 
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 In concrete terms, thus, I want to draw attention to two aspects of this history: one 
being the slow accretive process by which ideas of sovereignty were to form and mutate 
during the period between 1500 and 1900—from a notion of sovereign authority cen-
tred upon the coercive authority of the monarch, to the modern imagination of the 
‘nation-state’. The other being the parallel transition from a post-feudal mercantile 
economy to one centered (in Europe at least) upon industrial production and fi nance 
capital. In its most raw terms, the argument is that this history may be understood, 
albeit somewhat schematically, in terms of a shift in the conceptualization of the jurid-
ical politics of space from one marked by the notion of  dominium to that of  imperium . 
 Dominium and  imperium of course being seen operate here not merely as the juridical 
brackets that frame the ‘colony’, but also as having direct relationship to their etymo-
logical counterparts—domination on one side, and empire on the other. 
 2. Discovery and Conquest 
 For nearly a century prior to Columbus’ voyage to the Americas, the Crowns of Cas-
tile, and Portugal had been sponsoring expeditions down the West Coast of Africa to 
the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, and the Azores, the overt purpose of which was to 
locate a direct source for the gold, spices, and silk whose supply had hitherto been 
dominated by the Arab traders and the merchants of Venice and Genoa. In the proc-
ess, they had routinely sought, in accordance with the spirit of the  reconquista , the 
blessing of the pope 11 and had respectively been rewarded with the authorization, in 
accordance with the stipulations of Hostiensis, to ‘search out and conquer all pagans, 
enslave them and appropriate their lands and goods’. 12 
 Columbus’ voyage in search of an alternative route to the East Indies was not, in 
that sense, novel. Nor indeed was the subsequent involvement of the pope who was 
called upon to ‘arbitrate’ between the respective Castilian and Portuguese claims to 
the territory subsequently ‘discovered’. Yet Pope Alexander VI’s famous  inter caetera 
divinae of 4 May 1493 (the fourth of fi ve) was signifi cant nevertheless. According to 
the Bull, the Pope purported to ‘give grant and assign’ to the kings of Castile and Leon 
in perpetuity exclusive jurisdiction over ‘all . . . remote and unknown mainlands and 
islands… that have been discovered or hereafter may be discovered by you or your 
envoys’ lying west of a line running from Pole to Pole 100 leagues west of the meridian 
 11   FG Davenport  European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies 
(Carnegie Institution Washington Washington DC 1917) vol 1, at 11;  E Nys  Les Origines du Droit Interna-
tional (Thorin Paris 1894) at 284–6. 
 12  ‘The Bull Romanus Pontifex (Nicholas V.), 8 January 1455’ in European Treaties (n 11) 9–26 at 12. 
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of the Azores and Cape Verde. 13 If the demarcation seemed clear enough, it was 
clouded by the fact that it excluded those territories already under the jurisdiction of 
other Christian powers, and was also silent on the question of Portuguese jurisdic-
tion to the east. The two powers were thus forced to seek agreement as to their respec-
tive dominions—the subsequent Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of Tordesillas (7 June 
1494) 14 diving the world again along the same lines, but a little further to the West. A 
further treaty was also required—the Treaty of Saragossa (1529)—to identify the 
respective line in the Pacifi c in which, incidentally, the much treasured Spice Islands 
(the Moluccas) were effectively ‘sold’ by Spain to Portugual for 350,000 ducats. 15 
 These events themselves were revealing enough: in the fi rst instance, whilst the 
involvement of the Pope seemed to signal the residual authority of the papacy as the 
moral and political centre of the late-medieval  respublica Christiana , the subsequent 
agreements, by contrast, not only heralded its decline as the ultimate author of claims 
to power and jurisdiction, but marked the increasingly disputatious character of 
claims to overseas dominions brought about by the expansion of long-distance mer-
cantile trade. The formalities of the Papal grant, even if important in signifying the 
persistence of a latent theological structure in international legal thought, was only 
the beginning of the story (as the subsequent claim to the establishment of New 
France by Francis I amply demonstrated). Apart from anything else, any such grant 
was made explicitly dependent upon the symbolic appropriation of land by subse-
quent acts of ‘discovery’ and occupation. 
 In the second place, the divisional lines that were put in place ( rayas ) were not, as 
Schmitt points out, lines separating the realm of Papal authority from that which was 
beyond his sway, but were rather global lines operating as ‘internal divisions between 
two land-appropriating Christian princes within the framework of one and the same 
spatial order’. 16 In this sense the  Inter caetera divinae departed from the earlier lines 
that had been drawn in 1443 and 1456 that extended only  usque ad indos , and affi rmed 
an outlook which was to bring the entirety of the globe within the contemplation of 
(European) political authority. Thirdly, it was to signal a good deal about the prevail-
ing conception of political authority that was to undergird such acquisitions. That 
the Pope purported to ‘gift, grant, or assign’ the territories in question to the Kings of 
Leon and Castile was to look back in an obvious sense to a mediaeval theological 
universe of Papal authority, to feudal notions of investiture 17 and to the crusading 
mandate that had underpinned the  reconquista . It also, however, looked forwards 
towards the emergence of a patrimonial conception of territorial sovereignty in 
which Roman civil law notions of property ( dominium ) came to structure notions of 
 13  European Treaties (n 11) 64 and 68. 
 14  ibid 84. 
 15  ibid 146 and 169. 
 16  The Nomos of the Earth (n 5) 92. 
 17  See The Epochs of International Law (n 1) 231–2. 
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royal power for purposes of conceptualizing its expansion. Sovereignty and  domin-
ium , for such purposes, could be regarded as equivalent. 
 Each of these ideas were refl ections of the broader social movements of the time. 
At the forefront, here, was the uneven, but nevertheless, steady decline of feudalism 
within Europe prompted, amongst other things, by the emergence of towns with 
their markets, merchants, exchanges, and guilds, the introduction of money into the 
agrarian economy, and a new technology of commerce (bills of exchange, joint stock 
companies, notaries, etc.). 18 Whilst the commodifi cation of the rural economy and 
the associated decline in seigniorial rents was to signal the dissolution of the feudal 
political economy, it also stimulated the search for new sources of revenue—on one 
side through the centralization of governmental authority, the establishment of 
monopolies and systems of taxation and, on the other, the sponsorship of long-dis-
tance maritime enterprise in the hope of cutting into the existing circuits of trade for 
the supply of high-value, high-return, goods. 19 
 With the era of a mercantile absolutism just around the corner, Vitoria’s famous 
refl ections on the Spanish conquest of the West Indies might best be understood to 
be of a transitional character. 20 In one direction, and following in the footsteps of 
Bartolomé des las Casas, he was to deny the Spanish claim to possession on the basis 
of Papal mandate or discovery, asserting in the process not merely the limits of Papal 
authority ( imperator non est totius orbis dominus 21 ) but the essential humanity, and 
thus equality, of the inhabitants of the West Indies vis-à-vis the conquistadors from 
Spain. His innovation, here—to imagine a world governed by uniform principles of 
natural law ascertained by reason—was tempered only, however, by his subsequent 
endorsement of the justness of the Spanish conquest as having been based upon what 
he saw to be a legitimate  casus belli . His understanding of the conditions under which 
a just war might be pursued, however, was particularly signifi cant. War could not be 
waged, in Vitoria’s mind, merely for purposes of imperial expansion, for the pursuit 
of the personal glory of the Crown, or indeed to enable the forcible conversion of 
pagans to the faith. 22 The only effective ground was ‘a wrong received’, for which prin-
ciples of commutative, rather than distributive, justice were applicable. What consti-
tuted a ‘wrong’, however, was of importance insofar as it refl ected back upon those 
‘natural’ precepts of the  ius gentium that governed the interaction between different 
peoples around the globe. Here Vitoria was to lay down, as primary, principles of 
sociability, and commercial interaction. The Spanish had a right, he claimed, ‘to travel 
into the lands in question and to sojourn there’. 23 Further to this:
 18  See generally,  F Braudel  The Wheels of Commerce (S Reynolds trans) (Collins London 1982) . 
 19   P Anderson  Lineages of the Absolutist State (NLB London 1974) at 15–42 . 
 20  Between Equal Rights (n 1) 174–5. 
 21  ‘First Relectio’ in De Indis (n 3) 115–62, s II–1 (‘The Emperor is not lord of the whole world’, transla-
tion at 337). 
 22  ‘Second Relectio’ in De Indis (n 3) 163–87 at 170.    23 First Relectio (n 21) 151. 
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 The Spaniards may lawfully trade among the native Indians, so long as they do no harm to 
their country, as for instance, by importing thither wares which the natives lack, and by 
exporting thence either gold or silver or other wares of which the natives have in abundance. 
Neither may the native princes hinder their subjects from carrying on trade with the Span-
ish; nor, on the other hand, may the princes of Spain prevent commerce with the natives. 24 
 If, then, the natives were to prevent the Spanish from enjoying such rights of travel or 
commerce, the Spanish would be entitled to ‘defend themselves’ by force, to build 
fortresses and, ultimately, wage war, seize cities and provinces by way of retribution. 25 
The same would be the case, he suggests if the Indians were to prevent the Spanish 
from preaching the Gospel. 26 
 As has been suggested elsewhere, whilst Vitoria articulated these as universal 
principles he does not appear to have had in mind the possibility that the Indians, 
for their part, might avail themselves of similar rights. 27 Certainly as far as the 
preaching of the gospel goes, it was almost inconceivable that the Moors or Saracens 
would have the same right to wage war in defence of their faith. 28 Yet in some ways 
what is more revealing is the emphasis he places upon the institutions of commerce 
and property rather than those of Christianity. If faith, and the dominion of the 
Pope, could not serve as the governing conditions for relations with the non-Chris-
tian world, then some other framework of analysis needed to be set in its place. And 
Vitoria’s choice here—to imagine a world of individual and communal property 
rights through which one could address almost all relevant questions (from the 
implications of discovery to the legitimacy of conquest)—was signifi cant in two 
different ways. 
 In the fi rst place, Vitoria’s imagined world was not a purely hypothetical one, but 
in many senses refl ected a pre-existent reality. The global circuits of trade which had 
for several centuries brought to Europe the gold, silk, and spices in search of which 
Columbus had crossed the Atlantic, 29 was only comprehensible if one started from an 
understanding of a global  diviso rerum enabling the sequence of transactions and 
exchanges to take place. 30 Commerce, more than anything else, pushed attention 
towards the conditions under which both individuals and princes might claim to 
‘own’ that which they found in their possession. And this, of course, not only chal-
lenged received precepts of Christian thought (the prohibition on usury, the belief 
that ‘God made everything to be owned by all’), but was a concern that was to subse-
quently occupy jurists and political theorists such as Grotius and Locke for another 
few centuries. 
 24  ibid 152.    25 ibid 154–6.    26 ibid 157. 
 27  See Imperialism (n 1) 26–7; The Role of International Law (n 8) 8. 
 28  Second Relectio (n 22) 173. 
 29  See The Wheels of Commerce (n 18) 114–34;  JL Abu-Lughod  Before European Hegemony (OUP New 
York 1989) . 
 30  See generally  M Koskenniemi ‘Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution’ 
(2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 1–36 at 16–29. 
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 In the second place, just as Vitoria seemed to open out an entirely new imperial 
vision in which the emphasis was placed upon the ‘informal’ control of resources 
through private-law relationships of property and exchange rather than formal 
annexation, 31 it was also a vision resonant of a distinctively feudal imaginary. Whilst 
Vitoria understood that the conditions of political-legal coercion were centralized in 
the hands of the prince (in the sense that only sovereigns in his view could authorize 
the waging of war), and whilst the ruler was not entitled to intervene in his subjects 
enjoyment of private property (except for purposes of the common good), it was 
nevertheless not the case that political and economic power were yet entirely sepa-
rated. Authority and possession remained intertwined through a conception of 
 dominium that was understood to be both public and private, 32 encompassing mat-
ters of both jurisdiction and ownership. As he was to suggest in his Second Relectio:
 [E]ven if we assume that the Indian aborigines may be true owners, yet they might have 
superior lords, just as inferior princes have a king and some kings have the Emperor over 
them.  There can in this way be many persons having dominion  over the same thing ; and this 
accounts for the well-worn distinction drawn by the jurists between dominion high and low, 
dominion direct and available, dominion pure and mixed. 33 
 It was thus possible to conceptualize the jurisdiction of the prince being exercised 
over his domain in a manner entirely analogous to that exercised by the lord over his 
manorial possessions, just as it had formerly been possible to envisage the dominions 
of the prince to be subordinate to the temporal ‘dominion’ of the Pope. All were, in a 
way, a seamless part of the same order, within which the (putatively) private institu-
tion of property remained entwined. And in the same respect, Vitoria seemed to be 
refl ecting upon the semi-feudal character of Spanish colonial enterprise itself. The 
 capitulaciones which structured the relationship between the  conquistadors and the 
Spanish crown—in which the colonists were granted land, booty, and titles in return 
for of tax revenues and fees—envisaged, in effect, the creation of an ‘empire of trib-
ute’ 34 in which authority would be vested in a local landed elite who would organize 
the administration of their petty fi efdoms through a feudal land tenure system in 
which natives were assigned to estates (the  economienda ) and threatened with slavery 
if they failed to fulfi l the conditions of the requirement. 35 That the Spanish Crown 
subsequently developed an extensive colonial bureaucracy, monopolizing transat-
lantic trade through the  Casa de Contratación and regulating the  economienda system 
and the trade in slaves was only, arguably, a function of the degree to which spatial 
disaggregation threatened to sever the ties of loyalty upon which the entire system 
depended. 
 31   ibid 32. 
 32  First Relectio (n 21) in De Indis (n 3) 128. 
 33  ibid 130 (emphasis added). 
 34   R Blackburn  The Making of New World Slavery (Verso London 2010) at 129–34 . 
 35   E Wood  Empire of Capital (Verso London 2003) at 42 . 
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 3. Mercantile Colonialism 
 If the declining authority of the Papacy had been signalled by Vitoria’s refl ections on 
the Spanish conquest, this was only to refl ect upon the appearance of a new govern-
mental rationality in the following century aligning itself on one side with the cen-
tralization of sovereign power ( raison d’état ) and underpinned, on the other, by a 
competitive mercantilism that took as its end the enrichment of the State. 36 The prac-
tice of mercantilism, broadly outlined in the work of those such as Montchrestien, 
Mun, and Serra found its expression in a variety of institutions and policies: the sur-
veillance and control of imports and exports, the creation of free ‘internal’ markets 
(through the dismantlement of urban protectionism), the imposition of duties on 
foreign goods (for example, the Colbert reforms of 1664, 1667), controls over ship-
ping (for example, the Navigation Act of 1651 37 ), the regulation of currency exchange 
and controls over the export of bullion, the granting of monopolies, and the control 
of public fi nance through the establishment of central banks. At its centre, however, 
were two key ideas: that the accrual of wealth, particularly in the form of bullion, was 
dependent upon a positive balance of trade the achievement of which would become 
an end of government itself; and secondly that the conditions of competition neces-
sitated a balance of power amongst European nations which would be secured, in the 
fi nal measure, by means of a military-diplomatic armature. 
 The signifi cance of this new rationality for purposes of colonial expansion was 
several. In the fi rst instance, it took as its centre ground the problem of trade: 
although, as in France, one side of the equation could be addressed through the 
enhancement of local production and the encouragement of exports, as a whole it 
was to direct attention to the role of overseas commerce in the accumulation of 
pecuniary surpluses. And it was clear that it was long-distance trade that provided 
the unrivalled means ‘for the rapid reproduction and increase of capital’. 38 Whilst, 
furthermore, this did not rule out the conquest or settlement of overseas territories, 
this was by no means a necessary measure 39 and, indeed, could often be seen to be an 
obstacle to commerce rather than its facilitator. 40 The French, British, and Dutch 
thus all joined Vitoria in disputing the competence of the Pope to divide the globe 
between Portugal and Spain and sought, where possible, to limit Spanish and Por-
tuguese claims in order to break their monopoly over commerce in the West and 
 36  Security, Territory, Population (n 10) 285–306. 
 37  Navigation Act (9 October 1651) reprinted in  H Scobell (ed)  A Collection of Several Acts of Parlia-
ment, Published in the Years 1648, 1649, 1650, and 1651 (John Field London 1653) pt 2, at 165–9 . 
 38  The Wheels of Commerce (n 18) 408. 
 39   G Arrighi  The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of our Times (Verso London 
1994) at 141 . 
 40  For its signifi cance in relation to maritime relations see  GN Clark ‘Grotius’s East India Mission in 
England’ (1935) 20 Transactions of the Grotius Society 45–84 ;  C Alexandrowicz ‘Freitas  Versus Grotius’ 
(1959) 35 British Yearbook of International Law 162–82 at 165–6. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 08/03/2012, SPi
0001634692.INDD   870 8/3/2012   12:47:36 PM
colonialism and domination   
East Indies. 41 The French commissioners were to emphasize this point whilst nego-
tiating the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis of 1559, 42 as did the British 43 and Dutch in the 
terms of the letters patent or Charters granted to their own explorers. The letters 
patent granted to Cabot by Henry VII, 44 and Gylberte by Elizabeth I, 45 as with the 
General Charter issued by the states-General of the United Netherlands in 1614, 46 
merely limited the respective grants by reference to land already occupied by another 
Christian power. Increasingly, thus, even if Spanish dominion within parts of the 
West Indies had to be taken as a fait accompli, the grounds upon which claims to 
dominion might be based were increasingly narrowed. Discovery could no longer 
suffi ce in itself—particularly if it merely involved the symbolic planting of stones or 
the erection of fl ags. 47 Actual occupation was needed in order to justify the limita-
tions that were otherwise being placed upon the ‘right of commerce’, 48 and this 
theme was to become central to the subsequent discourse that premised title upon 
the effective use of land. 
 In the second place, since mercantilism took as its starting point the notion of 
national wealth understood in aggregate terms, not only was it blind to the internal 
distribution of wealth, but also encouraged an association between the interests and 
material wealth of the merchant class and the nation as a whole. This was, indeed, to 
fi nd institutional recognition in the development of the chartered trading companies 
(the fi rst of which being the Muscovy Company of 1555) whose role in colonial expan-
sion over the following two centuries would be critical. Whilst trading partnerships 
had long been a staple feature of overseas trade, the chartered companies were inno-
vative politico-economic amalgams: constituted on one side as joint-stock compa-
nies 49 but also endowed, on the other, with public prerogatives—generally rights of 
monopoly, but not infrequently rights to conquer and colonize. It was arguably by 
means of these public prerogatives that companies such as the East India Company 
(1600) the London and Plymouth Companies (1606), and Dutch East India Com-
pany (1604), to name but a few, were to increase the size of the respective Dutch and 
British overseas possessions enormously. The apparent ‘harmony of interests’ 50 upon 
which such arrangements rested, however, had certain consequences. In the fi rst 
instance it was obviously to obscure the distinctions made by those such as Gentili 
 41   A Pearce-Higgins ‘International Law and the Outer World 1480–1648’ in  J Holland Rose and others 
(eds)  Cambridge History of the British Empire (CUP Cambridge 1929) vol I, 183–4 . 
 42  European Treaties (n 11) 219–21. 
 43  The Ideological Origins (n 8) 107–8. 
 44  Letters Patent, 3 February 1498. 
 45  Letters Patent, 11 June 1578. 
 46   M Brumbaugh and  J Walton (eds)  Inducements Offered by the States General of Holland to Settlers 
on the Hudson (Christopher Sower Philadelphia 1898) at 4–5 . 
 47  The Nomos of the Earth (n 5) 131. 
 48  The Epochs of International Law (n 1) 249–50 and 396. 
 49  The Wheels of Commerce (n 18) 439–55. 
 50   cf EH Carr  The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–39 (Macmillan London 1940) at 42–61 . 
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between public and private war, between piracy and privateering, and between pub-
lic and private property. 51 Just as Vitoria had imagined the conquistadors to be, at one 
moment, private merchants exercising rights of travel and trade, and at another, the 
enforcers of public right, so also Grotius was later to advocate, in his  de jure praedae , 
a right on the part of individuals (and private companies of course) to resort to vio-
lence in punishment of ‘wrongs’. That this meant that private trading companies 
were entitled to aggressively pursue their commercial interests in the East Indies, and 
engage in hostilities and secure prize if they were unjustifi ably prevented from doing 
so, 52 was only such as to refl ect upon the fact that the distinctions in question (between 
public war and private enterprise) had yet to be made meaningful. That the same 
putative ‘harmony of interest’ was later to have the consequence of potentially bring-
ing the entire imperial project into disrepute—most critically exemplifi ed perhaps 
by the celebrated impeachment of Warren Hastings, India’s Governor-General, at the 
hands of Burke 53 —was only an indication of the subsequent movement here in which 
the idea of ‘public corruption’ came to signify the (advocated) separation between, 
on the one hand, the exercise of duties of public offi ce and, on the other, the accrual 
of private wealth. 
 In the third place, the focus on overseas trade also directed attention towards its 
necessary conditions, and in particular, to the status of the high seas and the naviga-
tion routes that provided access to the new markets. Whilst there had long been dis-
putes over the control of European maritime zones (the Adriatic, the Baltic, the 
Ligurian sea, or the  Oceanus Brittanicus ), the Papal Bulls upon which Spain and Por-
tugal based their claims only occasionally made mention of occupation or jurisdic-
tion over the seas. In contrast to Nicholas V’s  Romano Pontifex of 1455 which granted 
to the crown of Portugal exclusive rights in relation to the Guinea trade including the 
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in relation to both the land and sea, the  Inter 
Caetera edict, had merely prohibited the undertaking of voyages to the Indies with-
out permission of the Crown of Castile. 54 
 The debate that was to ensue following the publication of Grotius’  Mare Liberum 
in 1609 was conducted at two different levels. On one level, and that which specifi cally 
informed the work of Selden, 55 his English interlocutor, the question seemed to be 
that of the possibility of enclosure in which rights over proximate maritime resources 
(principally fi sh) and local security were at the forefront. In Grotius’ own terms, how-
ever (and that of de Freitas 56 his Portuguese critic), the question was more directly 
 51   A Gentili  De Iure Belli Libri Tres (1612 edn JR Rolfe trans) (Clarendon Press Oxford and Milford 
London 1933) vol II, at iii and 15. 
 52  The Rights of War and Peace (n 2) 79–90. 
 53  See generally,  NB Dirks  The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (Belknap 
Press Cambridge MA 2006) . 
 54  European Treaties (n 11) 72–4. 
 55   J Selden  Mare Clausum (excudebat Will. Stanesbeius, pro Richardo Meighen London 1635) . 
 56   S de Freitas  De justo imperio Lusitanorum Asiatico (1627) . 
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concerned with long-distance navigation and trade, and the implications for the lat-
ter of claims to  dominium over colonial possessions and the sea routes leading to 
them. The two sets of arguments were obviously related, however, insofar as each 
appeared to turn upon the question of ownership. For Grotius (who, of course, was 
writing at the behest of the Dutch East India Company), the sea was incapable of 
being subject to ownership insofar as it was not open to being consumed or trans-
formed through possession. 57 Like the air, the ‘sea is common to all, because it is so 
limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for 
the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or 
fi sheries’. 58 
 Just as an individual was incapable of establishing ownership over something 
which was by defi nition limitless, so also was the  respublica incapable of doing the 
same. 59 For Selden, by contrast, the sea was capable of enclosure through the medium 
of public navies and policing, much in the same way as local  dominium was exercised 
over rivers and internal waters—what was in question was not ‘control of the element 
of water, but control over the unchanging geographic sphere’. 60 
 Perhaps most signifi cant here is the politico-juridical organization of this argu-
ment. The difference between Selden and Grotius seemed to be one that turned upon 
a differentiation between jurisdiction and ownership—between what the Romans 
might have referred to as  imperium (the public powers of the magistrate) and  domin-
ium (private rights of ownership). That it was a distinction neither appeared to rec-
ognize fully (and indeed which Grotius momentarily explicitly denied) was only such 
as to confi rm the continuity of an essentially feudal equation of political and eco-
nomic power (‘sovereignty’, despite Bodin’s strictures, continued to be equated to 
ownership). At the same time, however, it was apparent that something new had 
appeared: as Schmitt points out, the real point was not whether the seas were  res 
nullius or  res omnium , but rather whether they represented a domain of law, or a 
domain of (lawless) freedom; and so far as the seas were thus to acquire particular 
legal status as ‘free’, was only such as to create two separate global orders each with its 
own related concepts of ‘enemy, war, booty and freedom’. 61 In one sense, Schmitt’s 
perception of an antithesis between the normative orders of land and sea might be 
associated with two distinct logics of imperialism—one expressed through a political 
logic of territorial expansion and colonial rule, the other through an economic logic 
of mercantile trade and navigational freedom. 62 Of course, however, they were far 
 57   H Grotius  Mare Liberum (1608) (JB Scott ed) (OUP New York 1916) at 22–9 . 
 58   ibid 28. 
 59   Contra, H Grotius  De jure belli ac pacis (JB Scott ed) (Clarendon Press Oxford 1925) vol II, ch iii, s 
iv, at 206–7 and s xiii, at 212–13. 
 60  The Epochs of International Law (n 1) 268. 
 61  The Nomos of the Earth (n 5) 172–84. 
 62  For discussion of the antithesis of territorial and capitalist logics of imperialism see  D Harvey  The 
New Imperialism (OUP Oxford 2003) at 26–30 and 183;  A Callinicos  Imperialism and Global Political 
Economy (Polity Cambridge and Malden MA 2009) at 71–3 . 
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from distinct: just as the mercantile communities saw as their enemy the monopolies 
and barriers to trade that ensued from (foreign) colonial rule or patrimonial claims 
over the seas, so also was it evident that advocacy of free navigation tended to coalesce 
in those places in which maritime strength would ensure eventual monopolistic con-
trol. The change in stance of the English crown in relation to the enclosure of the high 
seas, on that score, perfectly accords with the growing strength and size of its merchant 
fl eet. 63 What was, perhaps, of more signifi cance was the emergence of the ‘sea’ as a 
law-governed domain, in which absent outright ownership, the maritime powers 
increasingly sought to exercise powers of police—evidenced, in one direction by the 
subsequent enclosure of the territorial sea and, in another, by the increasing exercise 
of superintendent powers over the high seas whether under the Portuguese  cartaz (a 
17th-century version of the navicert) 64 or more generally in relation to piracy and 
slavery. 65 
 4. Settler Colonialism 
 If, as has been suggested, one side of mercantilist thought was largely concerned with 
external trade, the other side focused upon the problem of enhancing the local condi-
tions of production—of putting the population to work (through the regulation of 
migration and vagrancy and the introduction of ‘poor laws’), controlling what would 
be produced (through subsidies and land regulation) and maximizing the produc-
tive output of land (through new agricultural techniques). This not only brought, as 
Foucault suggests, the population as a productive resource within the boundaries of 
governmental activity, 66 but also had its implications for the use of land. If the 
productive output of land itself had to be maximized it was a proposition which 
found its immediate expression in the long history of enclosures in England, and 
elsewhere in Europe, in which common land was given over to private ownership in 
order to be made more productive. 67 That the ‘improvement’ of land had impelled 
the dispossession of an agrarian population in England was to have particular signifi -
cance for the development of settler colonialism in the 17th century—and not merely 
insofar as it provided the motive and means for such settlement (specifi cally the 
 63  One may note, here, the critical change in position adopted by the British at the end of the 17th 
century. See The Nomos of the Earth (n 5) 177–8; The Ideological Origins (n 8) 100-124. 
 64  Freitas Versus Grotius (n 40) 176–80. 
 65  See generally  L Benton  A Search for Sovereignty (CUP Cambridge 2010) at 104–61 . 
 66  Security, Territory, Population (n 10) 67–9. 
 67  See  K Polanyi  The Great Transformation (Beacon Press Boston 1957) at 34–8 . 
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existence of a dispossessed ‘surplus’ agrarian population who would settle in the col-
onies as indentured servants), but also its intrinsic rationality. 
 Settler colonialism as it was to develop in the hands of the British and Dutch in 
the early part of the 17th century differed from the earlier mercantile colonialism of 
the Portuguese insofar as it was concerned not merely with the establishment of 
local trading stations, but with the expansion of the dominion of the State and the 
volume of its productive land. 68 Sped by the appearance of new class of colonial 
merchants seeking to secure control over the production of sugar or tobacco, 69 the 
new settlements and plantations in the West Indies, Virginia, New England, and 
New Netherlands were thus, in the fi rst instance, stations for production and con-
sumption: they were to be supplied with (slave) labour, equipment, and an appara-
tus of security, 70 and would contribute to the general economic prosperity both by 
the consumption of produce from the imperial centre, and through the supply of 
new materials. Their integration within the metropolitan political-economy, how-
ever, was always dependent upon the latter’s control over trade—in the case of the 
British, for example, through the sequence of Navigation Acts from 1651 onwards—
and this increasingly became the principle source of tension as the conditions of 
self-government intensifi ed. Yet if the central idea was to settle and expand the 
dominions of the State, the operative means for doing so was not immediately 
understood in terms of straightforward conquest or annexation. 71 Rather it was 
through the technology and practice of individual land appropriation (or what 
Marx called ‘primitive accumulation’). 
 The early charters granted to settlers in the Americas were, on the face of it, pro-
foundly paradoxical. In one sense they were little more than feudal land grants faintly 
premised upon the idea that Christianity and civilization would be bought to the 
natives. 72 The fi rst Charter of Virginia granted by James I, for example, authorized the 
settlers ‘to make habitation, plantation and deduce a colony’ on lands or islands that 
are ‘either appertaining to us, or which are not now actually possessed by any Chris-
tian prince or peoples’. The terms of the ‘grant’ declared that ‘they shall have all the 
Lands, Woods, Soil, Grounds, Havens, Ports, Rivers, Mines, Minerals, Marshes, 
Waters, Fishings, Commodities, and Hereditaments’ 73 that subsist within fi fty miles 
of each settlement, and that land was to be held under common socage with one fi fth 
of all gold or silver ore to be paid to the Crown. 74 The curiosity here is not simply that 
 68  Empire of Capital (n 35) 103. 
 69  See  R Brenner  Merchants and Revolution (Princeton University Press Princeton 1993) . 
 70  See eg ‘Charter of Privileges to Patroons, 7/17 June 1629’ in W MacDonald (ed)  Select Charters and 
other Documents Illustrative of American History, 1606–1775 (Macmillan New York) 43–9. 
 71  The Rights of War and Peace (n 2) 120–6. 
 72  The Rights of War and Peace (n 2) 110. 
 73  ‘First Charter of Virginia, 10/20 April 1606’ in select charters (n 70) 1–11 at 3. 
 74  Select Charters (n 70) 1, 2 and 3. See also, ‘Patent of the Council for New England, 3/13 November 
1620’ in select charters (n 70) 23–33 at 28 and ‘First Charter of Carolina, 24 March/3 April 1622/3’in select 
charters (n 70) 120–5. 
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no mention was made of the native inhabitants (except by implication), 75 nor that 
there was little precision as to where the colony itself would be ‘deduced’, but that the 
conditions under which the grant itself was made were entirely invisible. This may 
have been to suggest that the grants were premised upon the idea that the territory in 
question was effectively  res nullius . 76 Yet, insofar as  res nullius merely signifi ed the 
possibility of things being bought into personal possession through occupation, 77 
this was clearly not an effective condition for the original grant. The grants were sug-
gestive, in other words, of a curious inversion in which the public authority to grant 
land seemed to precede the conditions precedent for the establishment of that author-
ity in the fi rst place—a form of appropriation before the fact. 
 Yet this inversion was to highlight a specifi c facet of the process of settlement—
namely that the process by which sovereignty and jurisdiction came to be claimed 
was largely indistinguishable from the specifi city of private acts of occupation and/
or purchase of land. 78 There were two overt reasons for this: fi rst of all because even if 
the settlements were originally conceived as a project of the royal State, the agents 
who would carry it forward were the industrious private settlers rather than the mili-
tary forces of public authority. 79 In the second place it was evident that even if in some 
cases the ‘grants’ of charter or of patent preceded the fact of settlement, 80 in many 
others they clearly followed it as a process of ex post facto validation. 81 Either way, 
however, the governing rationality was one conditioned by the possibility of assum-
ing individual rights of possession of land that had yet to be brought under the juris-
diction of the colonizing power. And it was here that the theme of land-improvement 
was to assume particular prominence. 
 Whilst Vitoria had insisted upon the existence of native title to land—and thus 
thrust the emphasis of justifi cation upon the possibility of conquest—Grotius was 
not only to develop the latter theme much more generously (allowing, amongst other 
things, the right to punish those ‘who act with impiety towards their parents’ 82 ), but 
was signal the opening out a new ground of appropriation that turned upon the con-
ditions of its use:
 [I]f within the territory of a people there is any deserted and unproductive soil, this also 
ought to be granted to foreigners if they ask for it. Or it is right for foreigners even to take 
 75  In Patent of the Council for New England (n 74) 25 however, it was noted that a ‘wonderful Plague’ 
had brought ‘Destruction, Devastacion and Depopulacion’ to the natural inhabitants of New England, 
leaving it open to be possessed and enjoyed unhindered. 
 76  Eg  J Elliott  Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492–1830 (Yale University 
Press New Haven 2006) at 32 ; Lords of all the World (n 8) 76–7. 
 77  On which see  L Benton ‘Acquiring Empire through Law’ (2010) 28 Law and History Review 1–38 . 
 78  Cf ‘Grant of Province of Maine, 3/13 April 1639’in Select Charters (n 70) 65–7(in which the grant was 
accompanied by the following: ‘Wee Doe by theise Presents . . . take the same into our . . . possession’). 
 79   EM Wood  The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (Monthly Review Press New York 2002) at 164 . 
 80  Eg ‘Charter of Maryland, 20/30 June 1632’ in Select Charters (n 70) 53–9. 
 81  Eg First Charter of Carolina (n 74) 120. 
 82  De Jure Belli ac Pacis (n 59) vol II, ch xx, s xl, 505. 
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possession of such ground, for the reason that uncultivated land ought not to be considered 
as occupied except in respect to sovereignty [ imperium ], which remains unimpaired in 
favour of the original people. 83 
 In one respect Grotius was merely drawing upon a tradition of thought that had been 
well established since the time of More who, in his  Utopia , had already advocated the 
settlement of foreign shores where land was unused. 84 But in a deeper sense he was 
also giving expression to the overt rationality underpinning the contemporaneous 
Dutch settlement of Guiana and Manhattan. 85 In its Charter of Privileges to Patroons 
of 1629, for example, the Dutch West India Company had declared that private indi-
viduals were ‘at liberty to take up and take possession of as much land as they shall be 
able properly to improve’. 86 Even if the same Charter went on to specify that they ‘shall 
be obliged to satisfy the Indians for the land they shall settle upon’, 87 this only went so 
far as to emphasize that what was being authorized, was the settlement of land beyond 
the immediate confi nes of Dutch jurisdiction. 
 Two aspects of this are noteworthy. In the fi rst place it was to refl ect back upon 
practice of ‘symbolic’ possession associated with the right of discovery. If unsettled 
land was open to be occupied, then that would go just as easily for territory which had 
simply been marked by earlier discoverers as it would for territory newly found. 88 
Title by discovery alone was effectively ruled out. Secondly, the underlying rationality 
of a right to appropriate ‘deserted’ or ‘unproductive’ land was one that not merely 
accorded with the precepts of mercantilism (to whit the maximization of domestic 
production), but also had buried within it a further implication: the right to appro-
priate land that was not being used productively enough. This was to fi nd explicit 
recognition in the subsequent work of Locke who was to remark, with America in 
mind, that even if land had come to be enclosed, it might nevertheless still be taken 
into possession by another if it were ‘left to waste’. 89 That this rationality led, on occa-
sion, to squatting (Plymouth) or the unauthorized purchase of land (Rhode Island 
and Providence) 90 is perhaps unsurprising. In the second place, however, in working 
through the distinction between the public and private aspects of occupation (what 
he referred to as  occupatio duplex ), and in suggesting that the taking of possession 
( dominium ) might leave unimpaired the jurisdiction ( imperium ) of the original 
 people, Grotius seemed to leave in the air the question as to how Dutch or British 
 83  De Jure Belli ac Pacis (n 59) vol II, ch ii, s xvii. 202. 
 84   T More  Utopia (1516) (P Turner trans) (Penguin London 1972) at 81 . 
 85  The Rights of War and Peace (n 2) 104–8. 
 86  Charter of Privileges (n 70) 49, s xxi. 
 87  ibid 49–50, s xxvi. 
 88  See The Epochs of International Law (n 1) 395–401. 
 89   J Locke  Second Treatise of Government (1690) (CB Macpherson ed) (Hackett Indianapolis 1980) at 
24 ; see further Empire of Capital (n 35) 109–15 and 157–61. 
 90  See  E Keene  Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius Colonialism and Order in World Politics (CUP 
Cambridge 2002) at 66 . 
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sovereignty might come to be established over their respective settlements in the 
Americas? The answer, it seems, was to be found in Grotius’ differentiation between 
forms of jurisdiction ( imperium ). Jurisdiction was primarily that exercisable in rela-
tion to persons, and only secondarily did it take the form of jurisdiction over terri-
tory. 91 This ordering of jurisdiction seemed, in some ways, to be descriptive of how he 
saw the settlement of the Americas: the personal jurisdiction over the Dutch and 
British settlers transmuting itself subtly into territorial jurisdiction as the settlements 
came to be established—whether by individual acts of ‘occupation’ or by the collec-
tive purchase of land from the original owners. Either way, however, sovereignty 
appeared to proceed from the fact of private appropriation rather than the other way 
round. 
 Emer de Vattel, who was later to return to the same theme almost a century later, 
was to fi ll out the sketch provided by Grotius albeit in slight amended guise:
 We have already observed (§ 81) in establishing the obligation to cultivate the Earth, that 
these Nations cannot exclusively appropriate to themselves more land than they have occa-
sion for, or more than they are able to settle and cultivate. Their removing their habitations 
through these immense regions cannot be taken for a true and legal possession; and the 
people of Europe, too closely pent up, fi nding land of which these nations are in no particu-
lar want, and of which they made no actual and constant use may lawfully possess it, and 
establish colonies there. We have already said, that he Earth belongs to the human race in 
general, and was designed to furnish them with subsistence: if each nation had resolved from 
the beginning to appropriate to itself a vast country, that the people might live only by hunt-
ing, fi shing, and wild fruits, our Globe would not be suffi cient to maintain a tenth part of its 
present inhabitants. People have not then deviated from the views of Nature in confi ning the 
Indians within narrow limits . 92 
 Whilst Vattel retains the same core theme, several notable shifts in the terms of 
debate are apparent here. In the fi rst place, and most obviously, the discussion is now 
framed in terms of the rights and obligations of nations: it is no longer a matter of 
private appropriation, but appropriation of a public nature equivalent to, but differ-
ent from, conquest. When laying claim to vacant territory, the nation acquires 
‘empire’ or ‘sovereignty’ at the same time as ‘dominion’—‘it can have no intention’ 
he explains elsewhere, ‘in settling in a country, to leave to others the rights of com-
mand’. 93 But at the same time as pushing the emphasis towards the rights of sover-
eignty, he opens up at the same time, a gap between public and private modes of 
territorial acquisition, in which the question of agency was therefore to become 
signifi cant: under what  authority were the colonists settling the land in question? 
Did they possess national character or were they merely emigrants? Was the 
 91  De Jure Belli ac Pacis (n 59) vol II, ch iii, s ix, 206–7. For this interpretation see The Rights of War and 
Peace (n 2) 107–8. 
 92   E de Vattel  The Law of Nations or Principles of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Sovereigns 
(Samuel Campbell New York 1796) book I, ch xviii, s 209, at 160–1. 
 93   ibid book I, ch xviii, s 205. 
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intention to establish a colony under the sovereignty of the imperial power, or to 
establish a new nation on vacant land? 
 In the second place, by drawing attention to such questions, Vattel was not merely 
to refl ect upon the growing demands for self-government in the colonies, but also to 
a subtle transformation in the prevailing governmental rationality that was to articu-
late itself increasingly forcefully in a distinction being drawn between the proper 
realm of governmental action and that of private intercourse. Whilst, as yet, the com-
ing separation of the economic system from general social relations was not fully 
apparent, Vattel’s contribution may be seen as one marked by a concern not so much 
as to enhance the end of the State through the organization and expansion of produc-
tive circuits, but rather to limit its authority by reference to the same precepts. The 
issue, as he puts it, was not so much the appropriation of territory for purpose of set-
tlement and production, but rather the prior ‘usurpation’ of land by those who were 
not in a position to use it properly. If this was to emphasize the importance of ‘effec-
tive control’ for purposes of claiming title, it was also to hint at an entirely new ration-
ality for colonial government—to enable the exploitation and use of land by bringing 
it within the ambit of an independent, self-regulating, market economy. 
 5. Imperialism, Political Economy, 
and the Scramble for Africa 
 If the early theorists of imperialism (Hobson, Lenin, Kautsky, Luxemburg, Bukharin, 
and Arendt) disagreed as to what it was they were seeking to describe, they were nev-
ertheless uniform in their perception that it was a phenomenon to be associated with 
the fi nal three decades of the 19th century. 94 During that period the visible enthusi-
asm for colonial acquisitions had led to an estimated 4.5 million square miles and 
66 million inhabitants being incorporated within the British Empire, France gained 
3.5 million square miles and 26 million people, Germany 1 million square miles and 
26 million people, and Belgium, through Leopold’s Congo Free State, 900,000 square 
miles and a population of 8.5 million. 95 The precise causes of the scramble were, of 
course, obscure: whether it was driven by the collapse in commodity prices and 
under-consumption within Europe, 96 the unravelling of the free trade arrangements 
 94  See  A Brewer  Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey (Routledge London 1980) ; Imperi-
alism and Global Political Economy (n 62). 
 95   C Hayes  A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900 (Harper New York 1941) at 237 . 
 96   R Luxemburg  The Accumulation of Capital (Routledge London 2003) . 
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put in place in the aftermath of the Cobden-Chevallier agreement of 1860, or by the 
emergence of the trusts, cartels, and monopolies associated with the rise of ‘high 
fi nance’ 97 were points of difference. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the appar-
ent over-accumulation of capital in Europe had encouraged the speculative interest 
in overseas investment (in trade, mining, manufacturing, railways, telegraph systems 
etc) which had, in turn, fed through into a self-reinforcing logic of acquisition: colo-
nies and protectorates had to be acquired in order to ‘protect’ overseas trade and 
investment from the dangers posed by the monopolistic or protectionist policies of 
rival colonial powers. 
 At the centre of this account of the late 19th-century ‘turn’ towards colonial acqui-
sition was the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 which, in many respects, appeared to 
stand as a symbol of this new Imperial era. 98 Articles 34 and 35 of the Final Act were 
particularly resonant here insofar as they sought to lay down the terms under which 
colonial powers might ‘take possession’ of land in Africa:
 Article XXXIV Any Powers which henceforth takes possession of a trace of land on the coasts 
of the African continent outside of its present possessions, as well as the Power which 
assumes a Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notifi cation thereof, 
addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need 
be, to make good any claims of their own. 
 Article XXXV The Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to ensure the 
establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African 
Continent suffi cient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and 
transit under the conditions agreed upon. 99 
 The limitations of those articles were made all too apparent when the members of the 
 Institut de Droit International were later to discuss their implications: not only were 
they territorially limited (specifi cally to the coasts of Africa), but they did not resolve 
either the question as to the necessity of native consent (as the US representative at 
the Conference, Kasson, had insisted they should) or whether the obligation to ensure 
the ‘establishment of authority’ subsisted in equal measure for protectorates as it did 
for possessions over which sovereignty was defi nitively asserted. In some eyes, the 
provisions appeared to endorse the idea that African territory was effectively to be 
regarded as  territorium nullius for purposes of colonization; in the view of others 
such a conclusion was implicitly denied. 100 In fact, when read as a whole, the fi nal Act 
 97   JA Hobson  Imperialism: A Study (J Pott New York 1902) ;  R Hilferding  Finance Capital: A Study in 
the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (M Watnick and S Gordon trans) (Routledge London 1981) . 
 98  See generally Between Equal Rights (n 1) 250–6; The Gentle Civiliser of Nations (n 1) 121–7. 
 99  General Act of the Berlin Conference Respecting the Congo (signed 26 February 1885) (1885) 165 
CTS 485. 
 100   J Fisch ‘Africa as terra nullius: The Berlin Conference and International Law’, in  S Förster ,  W Mom-
msen and  R Robinson (eds)  Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–85 and the 
Onset of Partition (OUP Oxford 1988) 347–74 at 355;  A Fitzmaurice ‘The Genealogy of Terra Nullius’ 
(2007) 129 Australian Historical Studies 1–15 . 
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assumes a thoroughly ambivalent character: whilst in part it was concerned with 
allowing colonization to proceed without confl ict, there was also a distinctively anti-
colonial thread within it. 101 This was true, in particular, in relation to the plans for the 
‘conventional regime of the Congo’ (which spread across the entirety of the African 
Continent from East to West) which sought the establishment of a ‘neutral’ central 
African zone of free commerce over which Leopold’s Congo Free State would exercise 
a superintendent responsibility. That such a zone never materialized and, in fact, dis-
solved into one of the most brutal of colonial regimes is, perhaps, only emblematic of 
the general contradictions that underpinned the agreement in the fi rst place. 102 
 Two aspects of the story of the Berlin Conference might be usefully highlighted 
here. The fi rst is the apparent confusion that the Conference sought to resolve con-
cerning the precise modes by which colonies and protectorates might be acquired, 
and which, at the same time, brought into contemplation the nature and signifi cance 
of ‘native sovereignty’. The second is the curious connection that seemed to exist 
between the two modes of colonial engagement in question—formal colonization 
on the one hand, and the pursuit of free trade on the other. 
 Before turning to these two dimensions of the international legal framework of 
19th-century colonialism, two particular aspects of its environment are worth high-
lighting. In the fi rst place was the decline of mercantilism as an animating philoso-
phy, and the rise in its place, of a new rationality of government organized around the 
idea of the self-regulating market and the institution of free trade. In the hands of 
Smith, Ricardo, and Say, the spirit of  laissez-faire government was to fi nd a new regu-
lating force in the natural laws of economic life which would become its ‘indispensa-
ble hypodermis’. 103 This presaged the gradual decline of formalized colonial 
monopolies, the winding up of the old charter companies (the East India Company 
being replaced by direct rule in 1858) and the rise of an increasingly fervent mercan-
tile free-trade lobby. 104 Paradoxically enough, however, colonization proceeded 
apace, gaining velocity in the ‘neo-mercantilist’ decades at the end of the century. 
 Secondly, the industrial revolution as it was to take shape in Europe had both led 
to the ‘political emancipation of the bourgeoisie’ as Hannah Arendt put it, 105 and to 
the emergence of nationalism as a political ideology and practical project. Whether 
prompted as a palliative to the collective anomie of an increasingly urban industrial-
ized workforce, or as a project associated with the creation of a skilled and mobile 
 101  R Robinson ‘The Conference in Berlin and the Future in Africa 1884–1885’ in Bismarck, Europe 
and Africa (n 100) 1–34. 
 102   SE Crowe  The Berlin West African Conference 1884–85 (Longmans, Green and Co London 1942) at 
4–5 . 
 103   M Foucault  The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–79 (M Senellart ed, 
G Burchell trans) (Palgrave Macmillan New York 2008) at 16 . 
 104  See  B Porter  Critics of Empire: British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge (Macmillan London 
1968) . 
 105   H Arendt ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’ (Harcourt New York 1951). 
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labour force, ‘nationalism’ not only spoke about the intrinsic value of ethnic or lin-
guistic homogenity, but also about the desirability of government by consent (‘le 
plébiscite de tous les jours’ as Ernest Renan was to put it). 106 This placed two potential 
constraints on colonial expansion: in one direction it seemed to demand the consent 
of those who were to be subjugated by alien rule, in another it pointed to the impos-
sibility of the full integration of colonial territories within the juridico-political con-
ception of the nation-state. 
 5.1. Formalities of Colonial Acquisition 
 If, by the time of Vattel, the formal rationality of colonial acquisition had largely 
reduced itself to questions of conquest or occupation, the conceptual frame of terri-
tory, understood in terms of an analogy with property (organized around the pri-
mary and derivative modes of acquisition) was increasingly problematic. Political 
economy seemed to demand a separation between sovereign authority and private 
ownership to which end a differentiation between  imperium (sovereignty or jurisdic-
tion) and  dominium (property) was important. The ethos of nationalism, further-
more, emphasized the relationship between the conditions of sovereignty (popular 
consent) and the spatial terrain over which sovereignty was exercised (who were the 
people?). As Arendt was to suggest, this was to pose a formidable obstacle to the 
expansion of empire: since a conquering power would ‘have to assimilate rather than 
to integrate, to enforce consent rather than justice’, 107 no nation-state, she was to sug-
gest, ‘could with clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign peoples’, since the impo-
sition of law upon others was fundamentally inconsistent with its own conception of 
law as ‘an outgrowth of a unique national substance’. 108 
 This was not to say, of course, that conquest was out of the question—indeed the 
forcible annexation of territories such as Burma (1826), Malacca (1824), Singapore 
(1819), Algeria (1830), Natal (1843), Basutoland (1868), New Zealand (1840), and the 
Transvaal (1901) was to belie any pretension otherwise. But Arendt’s point remains: 
confronted by the theoretical and logistical diffi culties of merging the juridico-political 
identity of the metropole with that of its colonial possessions (as pursued, largely 
unsuccessfully by France in relation to Algeria), colonial powers were encouraged to 
turn either to ideas of federalism, or to alternative, more fl exible, modes of rule that 
defi ed any pretension of annexation. Within the sprawling British Empire at the end 
of the century, thus, one was to fi nd not merely a plurality of institutional forms 
(protectorates, protected States, crown colonies, dominions, leased territories, con-
 106   E Renan  Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882 (Lévy Paris 1882) 
at 27 . 
 107   H Arendt  The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, Brace & World New York 1968) at 125 . 
 108   ibid 126–7. 
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dominia, suzerains, etc.) all of which had attenuated relations with the metropole, 
but also the emergence of the idea of an imperial ‘commonwealth’ that was at once 
internally divided, yet externally unitary. In refl ecting upon the legal form of British 
India, for example, Westlake was to explain that:
 [t]he colonial and other dependencies of a state are not in a personal union with it . . .
[n]either are they in a real union with the parent or supreme state, because they do not stand 
side by side with it as equals . . . . They form with it one dominion or set of dominions, repre-
sented abroad by the parent or supreme state. 109 
 This was, in one sense, to make relative the language of sovereignty: it assumed a dif-
ferent meaning depending upon whether one was focusing upon the inside, or the 
outside of imperial rule, looking towards the multiple forms of internal ‘dominion’ 
or outwards to the unity of the ‘supreme State’. One thing was clear though, just as the 
determination to differentiate categorically between public and private action seemed 
to encourage the articulation of increasingly rigid conceptions of State and sover-
eignty, 110 Empire for its part seemed to represent a resistant strain, formulating itself 
in terms of a loose amalgam of governmental or jurisdictional powers secured only 
by the privilege of exclusivity. 111 
 That imperial expansion seemed to be managed through an increasingly diverse 
set of institutions was, in part, a function of the extent to which the natives them-
selves were brought into account. However problematic, by the time of the Berlin 
Conference colonial powers had increasingly sought to justify their claims to African 
territory on the basis of treaties of cession or protection signed by local sovereigns. 112 
The rationality for this, of course, was not that indigenous sovereigns in Africa could 
be treated as possessing full legal agency as, apart from anything else, they appeared 
not to be ‘fi t subjects for the application of legal technicalities’. It would, be absurd, as 
Thomas J Lawrence was to suggest ‘to expect the king of Dahomey to establish a Prize 
Court, or to require the dwarfs of the central African forest to receive a permanent dip-
lomatic mission’. 113 Rather, they were to be assimilated to primitive societies due, or 
destined to be, civilized, 114 capable nevertheless of authorizing their own subordination. 
The theme of inclusion and exclusion was pervasive. Even those committed to deny-
ing native sovereigns any form of legal agency nevertheless catalogued and catego-
rized those non-legal forms for purposes of bringing them within the fi eld of thought 
and action. Some differentiated, thus, between legal relations as might exist between 
European States and non-legal, moral or ethical, propositions that governed rela-
 109   J Westlake  International Law (CUP Cambridge 1904) vol I (Peace) at 41 . 
 110  Cf The Epochs of International Law (n 1) 467. 
 111  Eg  J Westlake  Chapters on the Principles of International Law (CUP Cambridge 1894) at 128–33 . 
 112   M Lindley  The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (Longmans 
London 1926) . 
 113   TJ Lawrence  The Principles of International Law (DC Heath and Co Boston, 1895) at 58 . 
 114  See  G Gong  The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Clarendon Press Oxford 1984) . 
 115  Chapters on the Principles of International Law (n 108) 137–40. 
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tions with the non-civilized world, 115 others between the relations governing States 
enjoying full membership and those enjoying merely partial membership in the fam-
ily of nations. 116 
 The teleological ordering of societal forms which underpinned the liminal sub-
jectivity of the natives was to have signifi cance for colonial practice in two differ-
ent respects. In the fi rst place, it was to orient itself to the practice of colonial rule: 
if civilized States, as Westlake was to note, were those marked by the kinds of insti-
tutions of government, private law, and public administration found in Western 
Europe, colonial rule itself was to identify those conditions as being its objec-
tive. 117 If the marks of sovereignty were not pre-existent, they were to be produced. 
In the second place it was also to provide a new conceptual ground for colonial 
acquisition: this was not conquest, nor was it possession of vacant land ( res nul-
lius ), but control premised upon the capacity to transform (civilize) the natives. 
What was being brought into European control was not merely land and resources 
(as had been the case in settler colonialism), but also, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, people and markets. From that perspective it was not the case, thus, that the 
native inhabitants could be regarded as inexistent, or the entirely dispensable sub-
jects of colonial occupation, since they also seemed to occupy the role of potential 
producers and consumers. As John Kasson, the American delegate at Berlin was to 
insist:
 [i]t is not suffi cient for all our merchants to enjoy equally the right of buying the oil, gums 
and ivory of the natives . . . Productive labour must be seriously encouraged in the African 
territories, and the means of the inhabitants of acquiring the products of civilized nations be 
thus increased. 118 
 When seen in this light, the otherwise apparently disconnected features of the Berlin 
Conference appear perfectly congruent: the concern for the problem of ‘slavery’ or 
for the well-being of the native populations being driven, neither by a purely human-
itarian idealism, nor by a cynical desire to justify colonial intervention, but by the 
underlying logic of producing free labour as the generative condition for the market 
economy. 
 If the natives primarily came into contemplation as potential producers and 
consumers, it was also tolerably clear that their ‘voluntary consent’ was far from 
necessary in order to substantiate colonial rule, despite Kasson’s claims other-
 116   H Wheaton  Elements of International Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1866) ;  L Oppenheim  Interna-
tional Law: A Treatise (Longmans London 1905) . 
 117  See  S Humphreys  Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in Theory and Prac-
tice (CUP Cambridge 2010) at 109–21 . 
 118  Berlin General Act, Annex 14, Protocol 5, in  R Gavin and  J Betley (eds)  The Scramble for Africa: 
Documents on the Berlin West African Conference and Related Subjects 1884/1885 (Ibadan University Press 
Ibadan 1973) at 220 . 
 119  Protocol of 31st January 1885.  ibid 240. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 08/03/2012, SPi
0001634692.INDD   884 8/3/2012   12:47:37 PM
colonialism and domination   
wise. 119 The reason for this was not just the obviously questionable character of 
that consent, but an appreciation that the category of sovereignty qua ‘possession’ 
was, if anything, to be avoided. A notable illustration is to be found in the debate 
at Berlin over the extent to which the obligation in article 35 of ‘ensuring the estab-
lishment of authority’ was applicable to ‘protectorates’. Unlike Germany, and to a 
lesser extent France, Britain had not pursued a policy of seeking to colonize and 
administer every territory over which it enjoyed rights of protection, and in many 
cases, it had merely sought to monopolize trade under title of agreement, but yet 
only exercise, in the process, a form of consular jurisdiction over British Nationals 
(which, in accordance with the terms of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843, 120 was 
all that could be exercised in relation to those not subject to recognized forms of 
government). 121 Even if British practice was peculiar on this score (and of ‘doubt-
ful legality’ as Wilhelm Grewe was to claim), 122 its implications were nevertheless 
revealing. In the fi rst instance it was to recognize that colonial rule could, at least 
potentially, assume a form that neither resolved itself in a claim of ‘ownership’, nor 
in the active administration of territory. As Westlake was to explain, the new breed 
of colonial protectorates that had appeared (for example, Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, North and South Nigeria, and Somaliland) were those in which the colo-
nial power did not yet claim to be ‘internationally its territory’, but yet were 
designed ‘to exclude all other states from any action within it’. 123 If such a claim to 
jurisdictional exclusivity short of ownership was hard to recognize in terms of the 
received categories of territorial acquisition, it was perhaps only to indicate the 
limits of those categories as a way of conceptualizing the character of imperial 
rule. 
 A second matter signifi ed by this practice was that it revealed an essential continu-
ity between different forms of imperial rule. If one was to set aside the frame of 
 dominium as a structuring category, and focus instead upon the question of jurisdic-
tion, then it was immediately apparent that imperial rule could be understood as 
exercised through a gradated system running from, at one end, the establishment of 
regimes of consular jurisdiction to, at the other end, direct administration and rule 
over nationals, natives and foreigners alike. The essential fl uidity of the idea and 
practice of jurisdiction, and its capacity to express itself in both territorial and non-
territorial forms, was a perfect complement to an imperialism of commercial expan-
sion that related itself, only very ambivalently, to the intensively administered 
structures of the colony. 
 120  Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843, 6 and 7 Vict  c 94. 
 121   WE Hall  A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown (Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1894) . 
 122  The Epochs of International Law (n 1) 473. 
 123  International Law (n 109) 123–4. 
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 5.2. Imperial Free Trade 
 The central tension that ran through discussions at the Berlin Conference, and which 
arguably underpinned the inchoate form of the colonial protectorate was, of course 
the apparent confl ict between, on the one hand a commitment to the expansion of 
trade and commerce (which, for many, could only expand if made free), and on the 
other, the expansion and intensifi cation of colonial rule. This found its institutional 
expression in the distinction that appeared in practice between colonial rule, on the 
one hand, and the regimes of extra-territorial or consular jurisdiction that were to be 
put in place in China, Japan, Siam, Zanzibar, Muscat, and the Ottoman empire on the 
other. The distinction between these two institutional forms seemed profound. In 
the fi rst instance, whereas colonies were understood to be marked by the assertion of 
territorial authority on the part of the colonial power, regimes of consular jurisdic-
tion were, by contrast, premised upon its absence—there was no claim to sovereignty 
and foreigners were merely immunized from the application of local law. 124 Secondly, 
whereas colonial rule would have seen the establishment of national preferences, 
prohibitive tariff barriers and de facto, if not formal, monopolies on trade, the regimes 
of consular jurisdiction by contrast seemed to be designed to do precisely the oppo-
site. Thus, in case of China, in the aftermath of the fi rst Opium War in 1842, a network 
of bilateral treaties were put in place all of which sought to secure the necessary con-
ditions for the exercise of freedom of commerce. European merchants were provided 
security in their commercial transactions through the comforting blanket of consu-
lar jurisdiction in which all disputes, whether civil or criminal, familial or commer-
cial, would be governed by the laws of the State of nationality and heard by a resident 
consul (sometimes sitting alone, sometimes in a mixed court). Tariffs on all trade 
were regulated by the same means, fi xed by treaty and gathered by European customs 
agents. The replication of similar provisions in treaties with the majority of European 
powers (with liberal use of most-favoured-nation clauses), and their extensive appli-
cation to both nationals and  protégés (who might hail from other parts of the colonial 
empires), meant that a large proportion of foreign trade was conducted under the 
terms of such regimes. 125 
 For all of the theoretical differences that marked this activity from the parallel 
processes of formal colonization, there were several obvious points of connec-
tion. 126 It was clear from the outset that the regimes of consular jurisdiction were 
not entirely incompatible with the establishment of colonies by way of lease (Port 
 124  See  F Piggott  Extraterritoriality: The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and to Residence in Ori-
ental Countries (Kelly & Walsh Hong Kong 1907) ;  FE Hinckley  American Consular Jurisdiction in the 
Orient (WH Lowdermilk and Co Washington 1906) ;  G Keeton  The Development of Extraterritoriality in 
China (Longmans London 1928) . 
 125  See  PK Cassel , Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth- 
Century China and Japan (OUP Oxford 2012). 
 126  See The Epochs of International Law (n 1) 474–7. 
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Arthur, Weiheiwei), regimes of protection (Morocco), or mere occupation (Egypt). 
As time progressed, furthermore, territorial divisions became more resilient result-
ing in the establishment, sometimes formally sometimes informally, of ‘spheres of 
infl uence’ in which European powers mutually recognized their respective rights of 
commercial preponderance within designated zones. Siam, for example, was effec-
tively divided between the British and the French on this basis, neither of which 
purported to exercise anything other than consular jurisdiction, but both enjoying 
otherwise the privileges of colonial predominance. As Westlake was to point out, 
the sphere of infl uence was not itself ‘a recognized form of aggrandisement’ and 
had no particular effect in relation to third parties. 127 It was, at best, a ‘shadowy 
form of earmarking’. 128 But he was also to note how spheres of infl uence were occa-
sionally subtly reshaped into claims of sovereignty—his example being the ‘remark-
able’ agreement of the 12 May 1894 in which Britain purported to grant the Congo 
State a lease over territory, its only claim to which being that it fell within its sphere 
of infl uence as recognized in a treaty with Germany and Italy. His conclusion that 
Britain, in fact, had no basis upon which to act as lessor of the territory in question, 
did little more than confi rm a particular direction of travel: namely that spheres of 
infl uence were liable to ‘harden’ over time and formalize themselves in regimes of 
protection, 129 just as the latter themselves were liable to harden into a fully fl edged 
colonies. 
 6. Conclusion 
 In the course of this chapter, I have alluded to a series of shifts in the operative ration-
ality of governmental thought and practice: in economic terms from feudalism 
through mercantilism to modern political economy; in political terms from the 
emergence of absolutism to the territorial nation-state and the plural bracket of 
Empire; in legal terms from the scholasticism of Vitoria, through the natural law of 
the humanists to the anthropologically-informed positivism of the 19th century. 
Each of these shifts I take to be important in their own right, but more is disclosed, as 
I have sought to show, through their relationship to one another: in the way in which 
they shed light on the different technologies of colonial rule, shaping both its form 
and content at various different moments in time. 
 127  Chapters on the Principles of International Law (n 108) 188. 
 128  International Law (n 109) 128. 
 129  A Treatise on the Foreign Powers (n 121) 230. 
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 The key theme that I have sought to sketch out, is the shift from a conception of 
colonial rule framed in terms of  dominium , to one structured around the idea of 
 imperium . To some extent talking about a move from  dominium to  imperium means 
reading into the vocabulary of Roman law much more than is apparent in its bare 
terms. It was clearly not the case that late 19th century colonialism experienced a 
retrocession to the forms of Roman imperialism, or indeed that the vocabulary of 
Roman law was an indispensable adjunct to colonial rule. I fi nd it, nevertheless, a use-
ful expression to the extent that it reveals a shift in the discourse and practice of colo-
nial rule from a moment at which the technology of expansion could be articulated 
in terms of the straightforward acquisition of property (whether original or deriva-
tive), to one in which relations of property became the active object of colonial rule 
rather than its precondition. Colonialism was not just about acquiring things as 
property, but about turning things into property. If, originally,  dominium and  imper-
ium lacked a decisive point of differentiation, not only were they later to be set apart, 
but the rationality of  imperium was increasingly organized around the idea of estab-
lishing the conditions for the enjoyment of private property and exchange. Under-
stood as pure jurisdiction empire knew no boundaries, and followed ‘meekly in the 
train of exported money’ 130 but yet at the same time had to reach back to neo-feudal 
ideas of ‘ownership’ in order to sustain the exclusivity of governmental authority that 
exported money demanded. 
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